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ETERNAL FACTS IN AN AGEING UNIVERSE 
In recent publications, Kit Fine devises a classiﬁcation of A-theories of time
and defends a non-standard A-theory he calls fragmentalism, according to
which reality as a whole is incoherent but fragments into classes of mutually
coherent tensed facts. We argue that Fine’s classiﬁcation in not exhaustive, as
it ignores another non-standard A-theory we dub dynamic absolutism,
according to which there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and
yet undergo qualitative changes as time goes by. We expound this theory in
some detail and argue that it is a serious alternative to the positions identiﬁed
by Fine.
1. Introduction
According to a familiar way of characterizing the distinction between
realists about tense, or A-theorists, and anti-realists about tense, or B-
theorists, the former claim that there are tensed facts, while the latter deny
this. In recent publications, Kit Fine [2005, 2006]1 takes that characteriza-
tion for granted, and exploits a version of J. M. E. McTaggart’s much
discussed argument against the reality of time for the purpose of establishing
a classiﬁcation of A-theories.2 On Fine’s account, realism about tense comes
in three (mutually exclusive) variants: presentism, relativism, and fragment-
alism. While both presentism and relativism ﬁnd advocates in the literature,
fragmentalism is a hitherto neglected view, which Fine nevertheless takes to
be superior to its A-theoretic rivals.
We agree with Fine that presentism and relativism face problems. But we
also think that fragmentalism has unpalatable consequences. Yet, as we will
argue, Fine’s classiﬁcation is incomplete, as it ignores another hitherto
1Fine [2006] is an abridged version of Fine [2005].
2See McTaggart [1927]. We should mention that although Fine invokes facts, he claims that talk about facts
is ultimately to be recast in terms of statements involving his reality operator ‘In reality, it is the case that’, in
such a way that ‘The fact that p constitutes reality’ should be understood as ‘In reality, it is the case that p’
[2005: 268; 2006: 413–4 n. 1]. In what follows, we will stick to talk about facts, and leave Fine’s reductive
enterprise to one side. Two points about the notion of tensed fact are worth making in order to dispel
possible misunderstandings. The distinction between realism and anti-realism about tense is intended to be a
distinction between two metaphysical views about what makes up reality. Accordingly, the notion of tensed
fact involved in the proposed characterization of the distinction must be appropriately ‘robust’. By this, we
mean that (i) talk of tensed facts should be understood as talk about certain entities which enjoy objective
existence, and (ii) tensed facts should not be conceived as true tensed truth-bearers, e.g. true tensed sentences
or propositions. For tense realists and anti-realists alike agree that some tensed truth-bearers are true. A
tensed fact must be conceived not as a truth-bearer, but rather as a ‘worldly’ entity which can (or perhaps
even must) be invoked in order to account for the truth of certain truth-bearers.
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which should be used for any reference to this work
neglected realist view which we call dynamic absolutism. According to this
non-standard view, there are tensed facts that stay numerically the same and
yet undergo qualitative changes as times goes by.
We take dynamic absolutism to be a serious alternative to the three
positions identiﬁed by Fine, whose relative merits need to be thoroughly
assessed. We shall reserve such an assessment for another occasion, though
(see Correia and Rosenkranz [forthcoming]). Although we will propose
some arguments in favour of the view, our main aim in this paper is to
expound it in some detail and with precision, and convince the reader that it
is indeed a serious and interesting version of tense realism.
2. Fine’s McTaggartian Argument and the Resulting Classiﬁcation
of A-Theories
Fine’s McTaggartian argument is meant to establish that the following four
principles are jointly inconsistent [2005: 270–2; 2006: 399–400]:
Realism Reality is constituted (at least, in part) by tensed facts.
Neutrality No time is privileged; the tensed facts that constitute reality are
not oriented towards one time as opposed to another.
Absolutism The constitution of reality is an absolute matter, i.e. not relative
to a time or other form of temporal standpoint.
Coherence Reality is not contradictory; it is not constituted by facts with
incompatible content.
Fine’s argument for this inconsistency runs as follows [2006: 400; see also
2005: 272]:
It follows from Realism that reality is constituted by some tensed fact. There
will therefore be some time t at which this fact obtains. Now Neutrality states
that reality is not oriented towards one time as opposed to another. So reality
will presumably be constituted by similar sorts of tensed facts that obtain at
other times. But this means, as long as temporal reality is suﬃciently
variegated, that some of these facts will have incompatible contents. If reality
is constituted by the present fact that I am sitting, for example, then it may
well be constituted by the subsequent fact that I am standing. By Absolutism,
reality is absolutely constituted by such facts; and this is then contrary to
Coherence (and the underlying assumption of Absolutism).
Granted that the argument succeeds, a realist about tense—that is, a friend
of Realism—must reject at least one of the three remaining principles.3 Fine
3Strictly speaking, this is not true: a friend of Realism could accept all three principles and deny that
temporal reality is ‘suﬃciently variegated’. But we shall assume as given the (plausible) principle that if
Neutrality holds, then temporal reality is ‘suﬃciently variegated’ so that, to use Fine’s example, it is
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calls those realists who reject Neutrality presentists (the privileged time is
intended to be the present time), and those who accept it non-standard
realists. And he calls those non-standard realists who reject Absolutism
relativists, and those who accept Absolutism but reject Coherence
fragmentalists. The resulting classiﬁcation can be depicted as follows:
Fine [2006] argues that the non-standard forms of realism are superior to
presentism; Fine [2005] argues for the same conclusion, and in addition
seeks to establish that fragmentalism is superior to relativism.
But does the argument succeed? One diﬃculty in answering this question
is that it is far from obvious how the four principles are to be understood.
One reason is that they involve non-orthodox talk of facts ‘constituting
reality’. On our preferred view, the notion of constituting reality should
simply be identiﬁed with the notion of existing (as applied to facts). We will
throughout have this understanding of the notion in mind, but will
nevertheless keep on using Fine’s idiom.4
On this understanding of constitution, what Realism states is clear. We
take Neutrality to state that there is more than one time at which reality is
constituted by tensed facts, and Absolutism to state that constituting reality
is not a temporary property of tensed facts: if it is correct to say that a given
fact constitutes reality at a time, it will be likewise correct to say that it
constitutes reality at any other time. Coherence, in contrast, remains fairly
unclear as formulated, and it is only by looking at various parts of Fine’s
papers that one gets a grip on what the principle says.
In the next section we present an objection to Fine’s argument which
involves an interpretation of Coherence which, we think, is the right one.
3. The Missing Premise
Let us assume Absolutism, and let us grant that reality is ‘suﬃciently
variegated’, so that—to use Fine’s own example—reality is constituted by
the present fact that KF is sitting and by the subsequent fact that KF is
constituted by the present fact that KF is sitting and by the subsequent fact that KF is standing. In x3 we
explain how we understand Fine’s example, and hence what ‘variegation’ means in this context.
4Just as Fine wants to distinguish between what is the case and what, in reality, is the case (see note 2 above),
he wants to distinguish between what exists and what really exists—or, as he prefers to say, between what
exists and what is real (see Fine [2010]). Here we do not want to take sides for or against this latter
distinction. Should it be accepted, the concept of existence we are working with would have to be understood
as the concept of real existence.
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standing. We take this latter assumption to be equivalent to the assumption
that the following two sentences are true:
(a) At the present time, reality is constituted by the fact that KF is sitting—
call that fact ‘b’;
(b) At some future time t, reality is constituted by the fact that KF is
standing—call that fact ‘g’.
Taken together, (a) and (b) imply Neutrality. By Absolutism, the temporal
locutions ‘At the present time’ in (a) and ‘At some future time t’
in (b) do not operate on the subsequent predications of constitution: ‘at
time—, . . . constitutes reality’ is equivalent to ‘. . . constitutes reality
(simpliciter)’. Therefore, we must say that both b and g constitute reality
(simpliciter). Fine concludes that Coherence is violated. But is it?
Importantly, the notion of incoherence or contradictoriness Fine has in
mind is not the one that one would naturally expect: he is adamant that
fragmentalism does not entail that there are true contradictions [2005: 282;
2006: 402]. It emerges from Fine’s papers, in particular from his discussion
of fragmentalism, that the relevant notion of incoherence can be
characterized as follows:
For reality to be incoherent is for there to be two tensed facts f and g such that
for some p and q such that it is impossible that at some time, both p and q, (i)
at some time, both f and g constitute reality, and (ii) at some time, f is the fact
that p, and g is the fact that q.5
On that account, in order to conclude from Absolutism, (a) and (b) that
reality is incoherent in the relevant sense, we should ﬁrst be able to infer the
following:
(c) At some time, b is the fact that KF is sitting and g is the fact that KF is
standing.
Yet, (c) cannot be inferred from Absolutism, (a) and (b) alone. It is our view
that Fine’s argument involves a tacit transition from Absolutism, (a) and (b)
to (c). This move is licensed by the following metaphysical principle
governing the diachronic identity of tensed facts:6
Fixed-Content: If at time t, tensed fact f both constitutes reality and is the
fact that p, then for every time u, if f constitutes reality at u,
then at u, f is the fact that p.
5The quantiﬁed expression ‘for some p and q’ binds variables which occupy sentential positions. Depending
on which semantics for quantiﬁcation into sentential position is adopted, this characterization of incoherence
may require an appeal to an idealized language with suﬃcient expressive power.
6Here and below, principles with free variables should be understood as closed by means of the relevant
universal quantiﬁers.
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By Absolutism, g constitutes reality at both the present time and t, and so by
(b) and Fixed-Content, at the present time, g is the fact that KF is standing.
Using (a), we can then infer (c).
We contend that Fine implicitly makes use of Fixed-Content. As we shall
argue in x5 there is a plausible alternative to Fixed-Content, and once this
alternative is accepted, Fine’s argument for the joint inconsistency of
Realism, Neutrality, Absolutism and Coherence is blocked.
4. Versions of Tense Realism Under Fixed-Content
According to our diagnosis, Fine’s classiﬁcation of tense-realist views is
correct only if Fixed-Content is taken for granted. There are reasons to be
unhappy with any of these versions of tense realism. This is not the place to
argue against them at any length, but let us at least point out what we take
to be some important problems for these views.
According to presentism, reality does not extend beyond the present: it is
like a point event without duration. Presentism is subject to the charge that
it is indistinguishable from the Russellian view that the universe has just
popped into existence, replete with traces of an apparent past and future
tendencies. On that view, the present truth of our past- and future-tensed
statements is strangely dissociated from any past or future portions of
reality they are so naturally taken to describe. In addition, it is hard to see
how the view could accommodate change and, as Fine himself argues [2005:
286–8; 2006: 404–6], the passage of time.
It is natural to think of temporal reality as being ‘one’ and not ‘many’,
and the contravening conception that views it as a mere collection of
diﬀerent successive realities tends to strike one as implausible. Just as
there is not one reality where you are and another one where we are,
there does not seem to be a succession of distinct realities corresponding
to diﬀerent times, including, say, pre-war reality and post-war reality.
Talking this way may be a vivid means of conveying sociocultural,
political or economical diﬀerences between epochs. But when it comes to
metaphysics, one tends to see these diﬀerent epochs as parts of a single
reality. Relativism simply denies that temporal reality is ‘one’ in the
relevant metaphysical sense.
Fine distinguishes between temporal reality’s being ‘one’ and its being ‘of
a piece’ [2005: 262; 2006: 413]. According to fragmentalism, while reality is
indeed ‘one’—the constitution of reality is absolute, so that there are no
diachronic shifts in what facts constitute it—, it is not ‘of a piece’, in so far
as it fragments into mutually incoherent classes of mutually coherent facts.
The fragmentalist identiﬁes times with maximally coherent fragments [2005:
281].
One reason to be unhappy with fragmentalism is that it is incompatible
with a principle which has a great pre-theoretical plausibility, namely:
Truth: If at a given time t, f constitutes reality and is the fact that p, then it is
true at t that p.
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The incompatibility is easy to establish. Consider again our two facts b and
g. Given Absolutism, both constitute reality at any time, and by Fixed-
Content, at all times b is the fact that KF is sitting and g the fact that KF is
standing. By Truth, it follows that at all times, (it is true that) KF is both
sitting and standing—which is impossible.
The fragmentalist may feel unmoved by this objection. For he endorses an
alternative to Truth, namely,
Truth*: If f is the fact that p and f belongs to time t,7 then it is true at t that p,
and he may insist that the intuitive connection between facts and truth which
Truth is intended to express is perfectly captured by Truth*. Yet, Truth* lacks
the pre-theoretical plausibility of Truth, and ceteris paribus a view which
incorporates Truth should be preferred to a viewwhich does not, a fortiori to a
view which incorporates Truth* instead of Truth.
Truth is a consequence of another principle which also has great pre-
theoretical plausibility, namely:
Exp: If at a given time t, f both constitutes reality and is the fact that p, then
it is true at t that p, and the latter is the case because at t, f constitutes
reality and is the fact that p.
Since fragmentalists must reject Truth, they cannot avail themselves of Exp,
and this should be counted against them. Also, it is not clear that there is an
alternative principle they can endorse. Reﬂecting on Truth*, one might
think of the following suggestion:
Exp*: If f is the fact that p and f belongs to time t, then it is true at t that p,
and the latter is the case because f is the fact that p and f belongs to t.
Yet, Exp* appears to lack any pre-theoretical plausibility, if only because
the notion of a fragment it relies on is theory-laden.
A further objection to fragmentalism, which is perhaps more compelling,
concerns the very notion of coherence—call it ‘coherence*’ —at work in the
deﬁnition of a fragment. The notion of coherence* cannot be the one at work
in the principle of Coherence. For supposing, say, that there is no time, past,
present or future, at which Socrates is furious and Plato is anxious, the
fragmentalist should say that there is no fragment which comprises both the
fact that Socrates is furious and the fact that Plato is anxious, and accordingly
that these two facts do not cohere*; and yet, these two facts cohere, in so far as
it could have been the case that, at some time, Socrates is furious and Plato is
anxious. Coherence* entails coherence, but the converse does not hold.
It is natural to think of coherence*, and so fragment-membership, as
reducible to coexistence, i.e. to hold that for some given facts to cohere is for
them to constitute reality at the same time. Yet of course, given his
commitment to Absolutism the fragmentalist cannot endorse that account,
7Remember that the fragmentalist identiﬁes times with maximally coherent fragments.
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on pains of being committed to the view that every fact coheres* with every
other fact, and hence that there is only one fragment—a viewwhich, combined
with the identiﬁcation of times with fragments, is incompatible with
Neutrality. Now if the proposed account of coherence* fails, it is hard to see
how the notion should be understood. Fine appears to take the notion as a
primitive [2005: 281]. But on our view, the notion is prima facie toomysterious
to be taken as primitive.
5. Shifty-Content and Dynamic Absolutism
Fixed-Content is a principle about the diachronic identity of tensed facts. To
our knowledge, the question to which this principle answers has hardly ever
been raised, and accordingly the principle has hardly ever been explicitly
formulated. We argued that Fine’s McTaggartian argument makes implicit
use of this principle, and it is our impression that it is indeed tacitly accepted
by many tense realists.
But whether Fixed-Content holds or not is not at all a trivial matter.
There is nothing in the notion of a tensed fact that would force this principle
upon us. There is indeed another principle which, on our view, is prima facie
a plausible alternative.
Let us think again about fact g. We know that at time t, g constitutes
reality and is the fact that KF is standing. Assuming that g constitutes
reality at the present time, Fixed-Content implies that g is also presently the
fact that KF is standing. Granted that, say, t is exactly one day hence, on
the alternative view we have in mind, g is not now the fact that KF is
standing. It is rather the fact that one day hence, KF is standing.
For a general formulation of the alternative view, it will be convenient to
introduce some notation. We shall use ‘t is n days from u’
for ‘t¼ u’ in case n¼ 0,
for ‘t is (–n) days before u’ in case n5 0, and
for ‘t is n days after u’ in case n4 0.
And likewise, we shall use ‘n days from the present’
for ‘presently’ in case n¼ 0,
for ‘(–n) days ago’ in case n5 0, and
for ‘n days hence’ in case n4 0.8
8Which numbers (e.g. the integers, the rationals or the reals) one allows to provide possible references for ‘n’
depends on one’s take on the granularity of time. The use of metric tense-logical operators, as made familiar
by Arthur Prior [1957: ch. II; 1967: ch. VI], will prove crucial to the exposition of our view, in particular in
the reduction of times that we propose. Prior himself never used metric operators to this end. His tense-
logical reductions of times to world-states made use of the standard, non-metric tense-logical operators
instead [1967: ch. V].
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The alternative to Fixed-Content can now be formulated as follows:
Shifty-Content: If at time t, tensed fact f both constitutes reality and is the
fact that p, then for every time u, if u is n days from t and f
constitutes reality at u, then at u, f is the fact that (–n) days
from the present, p.
Shifty-Content implies that the tensed facts which constitute reality at more
than one time, if any, qualitatively change through time. In contrast, Fixed-
Content implies that tensed facts never change qualitatively, even those, if
any, which constitute reality at several times.
We assume that statements of the type ‘The fact that n days from the
present, p¼ the fact that m days from the present, p’, where ‘n’ and ‘m’ refer
to distinct numbers, are always false. Once this assumption is in place, it is
clear that, by endorsing Shifty-Content instead of Fixed-Content, one can
block Fine’s McTaggartian argument. For, assuming Absolutism, by Shifty-
Content, at the present time, b is the fact that KF is sitting and g is the fact
that one day hence, KF is standing, and at t, b is the fact that one day ago,
KF is sitting and g is the fact that KF is standing. By the assumption we just
made, at the present time, b is not also the fact that one day hence, KF is
sitting, and at t, g is not also the fact that one day ago, KF is standing. More
generally, thanks to Shifty-Content and that assumption, there is no time
and no number n such that, at that time, b is the fact that n days from the
present, KF is sitting, and g is the fact that n days from the present, KF is
standing.
If the foregoing is correct, then the combination of Neutrality and
Absolutism comes in two variants: fragmentalism, which accepts Fixed-
Content, and the position we call ‘dynamic absolutism’, which instead
accepts Shifty-Content. Fragmentalism, which for obvious reasons may
correspondingly be dubbed ‘static absolutism’, excludes Coherence, and is
incompatible with Truth, and so with Exp. In contrast, dynamic absolutism
is compatible with Exp, and so with Truth, and it can easily be shown that
the combination of dynamic absolutism and Truth entails Coherence. Thus,
dynamic absolutism escapes two of the three objections we raised against
fragmentalism. It also escapes the third objection, since it does not invoke a
mysterious primitive notion of coherence*. And ﬁnally, of course, it is
immune from the objections raised against presentism and relativism, since
it incorporates both Neutrality and Absolutism.
6. A Version of Dynamic Absolutism
There are various theories which fall under the label ‘dynamic absolutism’,
in particular theories which diﬀer on what they take the tensed facts to be.
In this section we present one such theory, which we take to be particularly
attractive (see also Correia and Rosenkranz [forthcoming]).
We call the tensed facts posited by that theory ‘A-facts’. An A-fact is
composed of one, monadic or polyadic, tensed property—the predicable of
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the fact, and of one or more objects whose number is that of the adicity
of the property—the subject(s) of the fact. In case an A-fact is composed of
several subjects, they compose it in a given order.
The tensed property which is the predicable of an A-fact has an associated
proto-property and a tense-aspect which constantly varies with time and
which we also derivatively attribute to all A-facts of which that tensed
property is the predicable. Proto-properties have no tense-aspect and should
not be confused with the tensed properties they are associated with.
To illustrate, assume that one day ago, John was sad, and that at the present
time, reality is constituted by the A-fact that one day ago John was sad. Then
that fact is composed of John and the tensed property of being sad one day
ago. The proto-property of this tensed property is the proto-property of being
sad, and the tense-aspect of this tensed property is one-day-pastness.
We should emphasize here that we use reference to, and quantiﬁcation
over, tense-aspects merely for the sake of convenience. Statements of the
type ‘Predicable F has the tense-aspect of n-days-from-the-present-ness’
must ultimately be understood as saying that, for some proto-property j, F
is the tensed property of being j n days from the present. Correspondingly,
quantiﬁcation over tense-aspects is ultimately to be understood as involving
only quantiﬁcation over numbers and proto-properties.
The components of an A-fact never numerically change. Likewise,
predicables always retain their constituent proto-property. Predicables and
A-facts are subject to the following identity conditions:
Two predicables are identical iﬀ they share their associated proto-property and
sometimes have the same tense-aspect.
Two A-facts are identical iﬀ they have the same subject, or subjects in the same
order, and the same predicable.
Owing to the constant variation of their tense-aspect, both predicables and
A-facts constantly qualitatively change through time. These changes obey
the following laws:
All predicables (A-facts) sometimes have the tense-aspect of presentness.
For every predicable F (A-fact f) and for all n and m, if n days from the
present, F (f) has the tense-aspect of presentness, then m days from the
present, F (f) has the tense-aspect of (n–m)-days-from-the-present-ness,
where the operator ‘k days from the present’ is understood as before, and
correspondingly, ‘k-days-from-the-present-ness’ is short for ‘presentness’ if
k¼ 0, for ‘k-days-futurity’ if k4 0, and for ‘(–k)-days-pastness’ if k5 0.
(Recall that the predicables are tensed properties and should not be
confused with their associated proto-properties, which latter are not subject
to qualitative change over time.)
Consider again the property F of being sad one day ago and the fact f that
one day ago John was sad. They both presently have the tense-aspect of one-
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day-pastness. One day ago, they both had the tense-aspect of presentness: F
was the property of being presently sad and f was the fact that presently
John is sad. One day hence, they will both have the tense-aspect of two-
days-pastness: F will be the property of being sad two days ago and f will be
the fact that two days ago John was sad. And so on. The principle of change
for A-facts thus ensures that A-facts satisfy Shifty-Content.
The proposed ontology of A-facts allows one to reduce times to classes of
A-facts. Say that two A-facts are contemporaneous just in case they have the
same tense-aspect. Thanks to the above principle of change for A-facts,
contemporaneousness is rigid: if two facts are ever contemporaneous, they
always are. Contemporaneousness is an equivalence relation, and we
identify the times with the corresponding equivalence classes. Let the index
of equivalence class c be the number n such that all members of c have the
tense-aspect of n-days-from-the-present-ness. Given that the tense-aspect of
A-facts constantly varies with time, the index of an equivalence class
likewise constantly changes. Yet, again thanks to the above principle of
change for A-facts, the diﬀerence between the indices of any two classes
never changes. For every positive n, say that class c precedes class c0 by n
days just in case n¼ the index of c0 minus the index of c. By what has just
been said, if it is ever the case that a given class precedes another by n days,
this is always so. We identify the relation of being n days before, as applied
to times, with the relation of preceding by n days, holding of equivalence
classes. This completes our reduction.9
The picture which emerges is accordingly this: although reality is always
constituted by the same A-facts, these facts undergo qualitative changes. In
other words, the A-facts are eternal but not immutable: they age as the
universe they constitute ages. This is what, on the proposed view, the
passage of time ultimately consists in.
7. Averting Hostile Takeover
Some might think that talk about tensed properties that change their tense-
aspect is just concealed talk about tenseless properties that merely
Cambridge-change in the tensed ways we refer to them. After all, just like
tenseless properties, the allegedly tensed properties mentioned so far can
never be lost.
There comes a point, in metaphysics anyway, where one is forced to dig
one’s heels in. Once we are at the level of theory and one’s theory aspires to
yield the ultimate explanation of why things are the way they are, one can do
little more than simply reject any attempt to recast that theory in allegedly
more fundamental terms. Indeed, if such an attempt proves successful at
all, it would always seem possible to turn the tables and reinterpret
9Fine [2005: 308–10] argues against relativism, and so indirectly in favour of fragmentalism, on the grounds
that it must take times to be among the basic constituents of reality. Given the availability of a reduction of
times to classes of A-facts in the proposed version of dynamic absolutism, the latter view escapes any
objection of that sort.
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that reinterpretation in one’s favoured terms, arriving at the original
formulation.10 Yet, that either theory is just a notational variant of the
other, with all metaphysical substance being lost, is rejected by realists and
anti-realists alike.
The problem proves even more intractable in the present case. Realists and
anti-realists about tense alike take tensed vocabulary to be a perfectly
respectable means to describe temporal reality. They disagree only about
whether its tensedness reﬂects an objective feature of that reality. Evidently,
then, the mere use of this vocabulary in an attempt to give a true description
of temporal reality will be insuﬃcient to disclose whether one is a realist or an
anti-realist about tense. The best one can do, it therefore seems, is to single
out a privileged context in which this vocabulary might be used and to hold
that if descriptions eﬀected by its use in this context are true, then tense is an
objective feature of temporal reality. Plausibly, the context in question is that
of metaphysical theory. Thus, in the end, we might have to agree with Fine
[2005; 2006] that, lest we engage in mere table-thumping, we need something
like a primitive Reality-operator (with a capital ‘R’) in order to successfully
express metaphysical disagreements. Metametaphysical doubts may, how-
ever, remain. But this is not the place to take on that sceptical challenge.
Even so, one might still hope to avert the envisaged hostile takeover. The
trick is to ﬁnd a principle, validated by the view proposed, which quantiﬁes
over a property such that one cannot endorse the principle while
understanding the quantiﬁer to range exclusively over tenseless properties.
For the time being assume that it is a necessary, albeit insuﬃcient, condition
for a property to be tenseless that it cannot be lost and so, conversely, a
suﬃcient condition for a property to be tensed that it can be lost. Although
the tensed properties composing our A-facts cannot be lost by their subjects,
there are higher-level properties of times that can be.
Recall our reduction of times to equivalence classes for contempor-
aneousness and the deﬁnition of the index of such a class. Clearly, a time’s
being present corresponds, via the reduction, to the corresponding class’s
having index zero. Now there is nothing to stop us from postulating the
existence of a property of being present, which we deﬁne as follows:
Pres: The property of being present¼ df the property such that always, for all
x, x has it iﬀ x has index zero.
Once this is done, our metaphysics validates the following principle:
(#) The property of being present is such that p presently has it, and
sometimes does not have it,
where ‘p’ names the present time. For by Pres, always, time t has the
property of being present iﬀ t has index zero, and while p presently has index
zero, it will fail to have it in the future and failed to have it in the past.
10This is all the more pertinent in the present case since, as McTaggart [1927: x610] clearly saw, tenseless
statements can be reduced to tensed statements, be they part of the object language or the language of theory.
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By contrast, provided that tenseless properties cannot be lost, then on any
view that regards all properties as tenseless, (#) will fail, irrespective of
which property ‘the property of being present’ may be taken to denote, while
any property deﬁned by Pres would have to be one that validates (#). So it
would seem that once the proposed theory includes (#), that theory can no
longer be reinterpreted exclusively in terms of quantiﬁcation over tenseless
properties. So, if a property can be lost only if tensed, B-theorists must deny
that (#) is presently true. B-theorists are likely to identify the semantic value
of ‘the property of being present’ at p with the property of being identical
with p, and trivially, p can never fail to have this property.
It might, however, now be feared that once we admit the existence of a
property that can be lost, we are bound to reject the absoluteness of
constitution after all. For, supposing that a given object x presently has a
property F and will fail to have that property one day hence, it would seem
that the fact that x has F will presently constitute reality and fail to do so
one day hence. In particular, then, if p presently has the property of being
present but no longer has that property one day hence, it would seem that
there is a fact, viz. the fact that p has that property, which does not
constitute reality absolutely.
In response to this worry we simply deny that the description ‘the fact that
p has the property of being present’ refers. This, of course, does not amount
to denying that there is an explanation of why the statement ‘p has the
property of being present’ is presently true: the statement is presently true
because p presently has index zero, i.e. because presently, for all A-facts
f2 p, there is a proto-property j such that being-j-0-days-from-the-present
is the predicable of f.
The proposed explanation of the present truth of the statement does not
obviously invoke truth-makers. It is in principle open to us to hold,
consistently with the absoluteness of constitution, that there is a fact which
makes the statement presently true, namely the fact that for all A-facts f2 p,
there is a proto-property j such that being-j-0-days-from-the-present is the
predicable of f. There is indeed no problem in taking this universal fact to
constitute reality absolutely. For provided that we are at all ready to
countenance such a universal fact, we can hold, in line with the spirit of our
metaphysics of tensed properties and facts, that for all n, n days from the
present, the said fact is the fact that for all A-facts f2 p, there is a proto-
property j such that being-j-(–n)-days-from-the-present is the predicable
of f.
Once such universal facts have been postulated, one might after all be
driven to concede that the fact-description ‘the fact that p has the
property of being present’ presently refers to a fact of that kind that
makes ‘p has the property of being present’ presently true. Note,
however, that this will have the odd consequence that the property
referred to in the context of that fact-description is not the predicable of
the fact denoted by that fact-description. It is for this reason that we
prefer to treat the fact-description ‘the fact that p has the property of
being present’ as empty, even if we leave it open whether ‘the fact that p
has index zero’ presently refers to a universal fact.
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Are we home and dry? It seems not. The position known as ‘adverbialism’
in the debate about the problem of temporary intrinsics suggests that anti-
realists about tense can avail themselves of properties that can be lost.
According to this suggestion, being a property that can be lost is not
suﬃcient for a property’s being tensed, contrary to what we assumed.
Adverbialists (e.g. Johnston [1987], Lowe [1988]) hold that in a temporally
qualiﬁed statement such as ‘The candle has the property of being straight at
t’, the qualiﬁer ‘at t’ is an adverb which modiﬁes the copula ‘has’, and
accordingly that such a statement expresses that the corresponding object
exempliﬁes the corresponding property in a certain way—in our example,
that the candle exempliﬁes the property of being straight ‘t-ly’. It would
seem that adverbialists can account for the loss of properties without being
committed to the view that these properties are tensed. For, if the candle has
the property of being straight at time t and fails to have it at a subsequent
time u, this is now taken to consist in the candle’s exemplifying the property
of being straight t-ly but not u-ly, and there seems to be no pressure to take
that property to be tensed.
It would thus seem that as long as anti-realists understand statements of
type ‘p has the property of being present at t’ in the adverbialist way, they
can after all accept (#) without thereby being committed to the existence of
tensed properties. By the same token, however, if adverbialism can
independently be faulted, (#) may after all prove suﬃcient to avert the
anti-realists’ hostile take-over.
Despite these diﬃculties we insist that the view here proposed is a version
of realism about tense (try to prove us wrong!) and that, however
controversial it may be, the mere availability of this view shows that one
is not, as a realist about tense, forced to choose between presentism,
relativism and fragmentalism.11
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